Rogue behaviors refer to behavioral anomalies that can occur in human activities and that can thus be retrieved from human generated data. In this paper, we aim at showing that NoSQL graph databases are a useful tool for this purpose. Indeed these database engines exploit property graphs that can easily represent human and object interactions whatever the volume and complexity of the data. These interactions lead to fraud rings in the graphs in the form of sophisticated chains of indirect links between fraudsters representing successive transactions (money, communications, etc.) from which rogue behaviours are detected. Our work is based on two extensions of such NoSQL graph databases.
: Labeled Graph
Graph Pattern Matching and Querying
Graph pattern matching is a very difficult algorithmic problem that has lead to the production of many works. We focus here on the definition and usage of 60 pattern matching queries. Some related works are presented in Section 6. The goal of pattern matching is to retrieve a pattern from data. In graph pattern matching, the pattern and the source data are both organized as graphs, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . of a graph pattern Q from a source graph G. The problem of deciding whether a subgraph is included within another one is known as subgraph isomorphism, which is known to be NP-complete.
Definition 4 (Subgraph Isomorphism). Let Q = (V Q , E Q ) and G = (V, E) be graphs. A subgraph isomorphism from Q to G is a function f :
Subgraph matching aims at retrieving the occurrences and does not only focus on the decision problem, as defined above from [6] . Such pattern matching techniques are implemented in the so-called NoSQL 80 graph databases together with many other features, thus allowing these frameworks to efficiently address rogue behavior detection.
NoSQL Graph Databases
NoSQL graph databases [7] are based on these concepts, attributes and values over the attributes being stored thanks to the (key, value) paradigm 85 which is very common in NoSQL databases. Fig. 3 shows a graph and its structure in (key, value) pairs.
Studies have shown that these technologies present good performances, far better than classical relational databases, for representing and querying such large graph databases. There exist several NoSQL graph database engines (Ori-90 entDB, Neo4J,HyperGraphDB, etc.) [8] . Neo4J is recognized as being among the top engines in terms of performance [5] . It has been recently extended for managing the successive versions of the graph database in the Mnemosyne system described below.
Mnemosyne: an Innovative Temporal Data Management System
95 [9] aims at proposing an innovative model of history management in NoSQL graph databases. There have been several proposals in the literature for managing evolving graphs [10] . [9] focuses on property graphs and is based on three key concepts: (i) Using the graph to manage time-variant data; (ii) Totally decoupling data historization from the representation of the data in the 100 graph datasource; (iii) Using generic graph traversals regardless of the graph datasource.
One of the main specificity of the Mnemosyne system is that it uses two Rev.0 stands for the initial version of all the elements, should they be nodes or relations.
When several modifications have occurred, the VersionGraph becomes more complex and several revisions appear. These revisions can be traversed with 120 different points of view, depending on the user needs to trace nodes or elements, as illustrated by Fig. 7 .
Problem Statement
In this paper, we focus on malicious human actions in the form of rogue behaviors. Such activities are known to lead to significant financial losses.
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These behaviors can be detected as they differ from regular honest ones. Fraud detection is thus often considered as a subtopic of anomaly detection to detect irregular activities. Anomaly detection has been widely studied [11] .
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In this work, we claim that fraud data are often fundamentally graphs.
Fraudsters act in an indirect manner in order to remain hidden as long as 130 possible. Some of them may rely on vehicles or fake corporations. Most of them operate in groups so as to introduce a complexity and a volume of interactions that prevent the fraud from being visible.
However, when focusing on graphs, few works have been produced [12] . In such problems, fraudsters try to remain hidden by acting in groups so that no 135 action is then a direct one. Intermediate layers are meant to hide the association of fraudsters. It should be noted that, if the size of the group is too small, then the fraud can more easily be detected, but if the size is too big, there is a higher probability of an error occurring, whether it be caused by coincidence or caused by a weak link in the circle of members. The size of the group being organized 140 for the fraud ranges from two to several.
In our work, we focus on fraud rings [13] defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Fraud Ring). Given a graph G, a fraud ring (also known as fraud cycle) can be defined as a subgraph F ⊆ G where there exist at least two nodes n 1 , n 2 ∈ F that are indirectly connected in both directions in a period of 145 time, with n 1 − [ * ]− > n 2 and n 2 − [ * ]− > n 1 .
A fraud ring betrays illegal links between the nodes n 1 and n 2 .
Many problems are based on fraud rings, from corruption, insurance and bank fraud, to shell companies, etc. Even in human resources management, some people can take advantage of friendships or close relationships to unfairly 150 attain positions of power. Many works and methods have addressed this problem but fraudsters have built innovative practices that are not easily discovered by existing tools.
For instance, for insurance fraud, some people claim millions of dollars after declaring fake accidents, fake passengers and fake witnesses. We focus on the bank fraud detection as discussed in [14] . In such frauds, a circle of individuals share some legal documents and create accounts. The credit lines and accounts are used, and gradually merged with unsecured lines.
As depicted in [14] : "One day the ring busts out, coordinating their activity, maxing out all of their credit lines, and disappearing. Sometimes fraudsters 165 will go a step further and bring all of their balances to zero using fake checks 10 immediately before the prior step, doubling the damage".
For this purpose, link analysis and discrete data analysis have been proposed and applied, for instance using the Neo4j tools or in [15, 16] . For instance it can help to retrieve the "account holders who share more than one piece of 170 legitimate contact information" which is very easy when data are represented using graph structures.
Problem
In this paper, we focus on the exploitation of the relations, of the history and of the labels contained in the graph for retrieving fraud rings. We claim 175 that:
• history is a key feature for discovering such rings. Time is indeed important and fraudsters are playing with delays in order to gradually root their actions. However, time is not always represented in the systems used to store the information, which prevents organizations from efficiently wiping 180 out fraud and corruption.
• fuzziness is required as such patterns are approximate.
• many algorithms have been designed, but their implementation on real world problems and engines is not always tractable. We thus consider the use of adapted tools with the capabilities to express such queries in 185 declarative languages.
The next section introduces various means to address these points.
First Attempt
As shown above, fraud detection relies on the discovery of graph patterns in the successive states of the data. This section relies on a classic example of 190 bank fraud as depicted in [14] .
Banks and Insurance companies lose billions of dollars every year to fraud.
Traditional methods of fraud detection play an important role in minimizing 11 these losses. However increasingly sophisticated fraudsters have developed a variety of ways to elude discovery, both by working together, and by leveraging 195 various other means of constructing false identities. The dataset used in this section is defined in Fig. 10 . Green circled nodes represent fraudsters and red circled nodes represent the connection points between these people.
In this section, we first introduce a standard pattern matching resolution 200 to detect fraud rings in a graph. This kind of resolution works well when all the data are available (which means that no valuable information for resolution has been erased or replaced). To handle this problem, there are two main ways: (i) by embedding the history within the operational model. This creates difficulties as the patterns for fraud detection must then be written in an adhoc 205 manner, depending on the specific model; (ii) by considering a generic model for describing the history that is compatible with pattern matching. This allows the user to write generic pattern matching queries for retrieving the fraud rings.
This latter case is explored by presenting how the Mnemosyne model can help. 
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The result of the execution of Listing 1 is shown in Fig. 11 .
Such queries rely on the so called Cypher language which runs as a declarative language over NoSQL graph databases. These queries include the following • MATCH: The graph pattern to match, bound to the starting points in START;
• WHERE: Filtering criteria;
• RETURN: What to return;
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• CREATE: Creates nodes and relationships;
• DELETE: Removes nodes, relationships and properties;
• SET: Set values to properties;
• FOREACH: Performs updating actions once per element in a list;
• WITH: Divides a query into multiple, distinct parts.
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For instance, the following query returns all the nodes of type accountholder:
The following query returns all the relations between two accountholders, whatever the type of their relation:
. Resolution Generalization
In fact, resolution of these kind of problems can be as generalized as answering this question: "Do some people share some information?". Expressing the query for responding to such a question can be more generically answered with 270 queries like:
We can then apply this algorithm in the same manner to other graphs that are not in the same business area.
Temporal Pattern Matching Resolution
In this section, temporal queries rely on the Mnemosyne model presented in 280 Section 2.
Fraud Ring: Temporal Cheating
It should be noted that expressing pattern matching defined in Section 4.1
can be done on existing insurance/bank data as such applications are meant to store and trace the history. However, this is not always the case. Fig. 12 shows 285 how, if history was not managed in such systems, fraudsters can cheat to stay hidden by creating, updating, and deleting information over time.
In this case, the above algorithms will not detect any fraud ring as they cannot manage history. To help organizations to find frauds, it is thus necessary to record historical tracks. It should be noted that the VersionGraph manages the history in the same manner no matter what the business area may be. The Mnemosyne system represents the history in the same way despite the heterogeneity of the DataGraph (in terms of types as well as structures of data). This is due to the generic nature 300 offered by the system which does not focus on the semantics of data and which provides a strong dissociation between the data (in the sense of information) and the data structure.
However, in this model, the representation does not materialize the links between the impacted neighborhoods. For instance, if a relation is added, then 305 the incoming and outgoing nodes are changed in the graph. All these operations will thus be traced in the Mnemosyne VersionGraph, but no link is traced between the elements (to manage performance optimization).
We thus propose to materialize these links in order to speed up the process.
If a relation is updated, then the Mnemosyne will materialize (by a relationship 310 in the VersionGraph) the impacted nodes and relations.
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In our system, this materialization is triggered by any change on the data, following algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Materializing Change Impacts Data: V G i : Input Version Graph for Graph G, R ∈ G revised relation As shown in this Cypher query, all the elements impacted on the graph can easily be retrieved by exploiting the materialized links of the history from the extension we propose. The result of this query is displayed in figure 14 .
However, we claim that the patterns to be found cannot be defined in a crisp manner and propose below an extension to fuzzy historical patterns. We thus propose using fuzzy clauses in the pattern matching queries.
Defining fuzzy clauses
Fuzzy queries have been extensively studied in the literature, mainly on relational databases and more recently on NoSQL gaph databases. The propositions can either address classical crisp databases ( [17] ) or fuzzy graphs [18, 19] . 345 Temporal fuzzy clauses can be defined either by considering the fuzzy Allen intervals or by considering user defined clauses. User can define temporal graduation such as "some days" and "several weeks". Fig. 15 draws a membership function defining "several weeks". This membership function defines a degree of membership of a number of weeks to the term "several weeks". For instance, 3 350 weeks has a degree of membership of 1 but more than 5 weeks as a lower degree of membership (may be months could be a better term?).
An implementation of the membership function of Figure 15 has been made and named "fuzzyWeeks". This membership function is used in the query of 
Generalizing Fuzzy Clause to Handle any Rogue Behavior
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The main drawback of the solution presented above is that for each specific need a new function has to be developed (e.g. fuzzyWeek, fuzzyDistance).
This means that for each fuzzy clause, it is necessary to define a hard coded membership function.
This lack of genericity has highlighted the need for improvements that can 390 adapt the detection to each rogue behavior.
To do so, it is necessary to offer the user the ability (i) to propose high level definition of fuzzy terms (ii) to use this definitions inside a declarative graph pattern matching query language.
Fuzzy Linguistic Terms Definition in Behavioral Anomalies Detection
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Searching for anomalies detection means searching for links between some data. There are different kinds of links such as relational links (is there some relation, may it be direct or indirect, that can rely this person A with person B?), temporal links (have event e1 and event e2 happened in the same temporal frame?), geographical links, etc. Each of this dimension has its own vocabulary 400 and its own graduation.
What has been previously proposed in this article is a high level pattern matching system that uses the genericity of the underlying versioning system to detect anomalies in suspicious patterns. This approach has been enriched in the beginning of this section with the use of fuzzy functions that account for 405 the fact that parameters cannot always be defined in a strict manner, especially when searching for behavioral anomalies.
In the remainder of this section, the goal is to define and provide a system that offers to the user the ability to define his/her own terms definition according to his/her functional specific domain. 410 
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We propose the use of linguistic terms and more generally linguistic variables to express domain concerns. Every term will be associated to a membership function offering the ability to define fuzzy linguistic terms and variables. 
Fuzzy linguistic terms grammar 420
To express linguistic terms, we rely on our previous defined work on fuzzy logic and our previous implementations based on functional programming.
In functional programming, a common approach is to model parsers as functions and to define higher-order functions (also called combinators) that implement grammar constructions such as sequencing, choice, and repetition. As 425 explained in [20] , the basic idea dates back to 1970s [21] and has become popular since the 1980s in a variety of functional programming languages [22, 23, 24] .
The parsing expression grammar we chose to express fuzzy linguistic variale is defined in Listing 6. Listing 7 and 8 gives the definition of two linguistic terms "temporal" and "distance" that will be used in the next section.
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Listing 7: Fuzzy linguistic definition of week The Cypher language does not allow the use of fuzzy definitions. To do so, it is necessary to extend the language. Discussion about extending a graph pattern matching declarative language has been done in [17] . Cypherf, standing for Cypher fuzzy, is an extension of the cypher language that allows the user The next section presents the related work on frauds, fuzzy and temporal graph data.
Related Work
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Fraud detection has been a hot topic for many years as its impact is extensive in many fields and sectors such as industry, finance, bank, insurance, organized and corporate crime, health care, etc.
Rogue behaviors can be detected using several methods. The most common ones from the literature are based on statistical methods, pattern recognition, 530 expert systems and machine learning [25] . These techniques can be applied on several kinds of data such as time series or transactional data, depending on the type of context being considered: computer intrusion, credit card fraud, telecommunication fraud, etc. However there are only few works on graph data. Algorithms have been defined for several types of data sources. Transactional 545 and stream data have been extensively addressed, especially for dealing with bank and finance frauds and can be regarded as outlier detection in stream data [28] .
Frauds and Detection
As frauds are generated by humans, their characteristics are often impossible to define in a crisp manner. For this reason, many works have addressed the use 550 of soft computing and formal representations of imprecision and uncertainty.
[29] reviews the main methods from intelligent systems that can help, from fuzzy neural networks to genetic algorithms.
[30] proposes the use of fuzzy clustering in the particular context of corporate fraud. [31] focuses on auction frauds and proposes the use of fuzzy rules that are optimized by genetic algorithms.
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Regarding graph-based data, outlier detection has been less addressed as it is much more complex. Recent works have addressed the detection of outliers in graph streams [32] and temporal data and graphs [33] .
However, no work has addressed fuzzy fraud ring detection from temporal graph data.
560
In order to detect frauds from such graph data, graph pattern must be considered.
Graph Pattern Matching
Graph pattern matching is distinguished from graph mining where frequent subgraphs are searched for [34, 35] .
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[36] addresses several topics within the framework of the approximate graph matching problem, as for instance the computation of the distance between two graphs.
Temporal queries have been studied since the beginning of databases, in relational databases [37] , data warehouses [38] and Web data [39, 40] . However, Temporal SQL has been extensively studied, and has been fuzzified [43] to describe for instance that the event B occurs long before event A, or that event
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A occurs before or approximately at the same date as the event B.
For all the above-mentioned topics, graphs can be queried through languages.
Some of them have been studied in the literature. Some languages have been proposed by scientists and some other ones have been issued by the editors. where subgraph matching appears to be one of the most powerful and necessary query, including approximate matching.
[45] proposes a propositional dynamic logic that extends several graph database languages.
[46] introduces GraphQL, a graph algebra capable of taking into account 590 nodes, relations, and attributes on both nodes and relations. In this language, the authors define the so-called graph pattern as a pair P = (M, F) where M is a graph motif and F is a predicate on the attributes of the motif. The algebra contains several operations, including selection, cartesian product, join and composition. It also demonstrates that their algebra is contained into Datalog, 595 thus allowing for rewriting their queries in Datalog.
Conclusion and Further Work
Rogue behaviors often amount to human abnormal interactions also called fraud rings. We thus discuss in this paper how property graphs can help for rogue behavior detection by focusing on interactions. We focus on NoSQL 600 graph databases that offer a useful framework to deal with large graph-based datasets. This paper extends [47] which has introduced a first attempt to NoSQL graph queries for rogue detection. It puts the emphasis on the use of fuzzy queries in order to better address the approximate definitions inherent in such human activities. This paper introduces the use of a Domain Specific Language 605 and a declarative fuzzy query language (Cypherf) to better address and resolve sophisticated cases.
The use of NoSQL graph databases is a key element of our work. We especially claim that representing the successive versions of the graph data allows to better retrieve the chains of successive transactions that represent a fraud. For 610 this purpose, we consider using the Mnemosyne system that has been extended for materializing temporal relations between objects. This allows us to directly apply pattern matching on the graph for retrieving the fraud rings.
Further works aim at integrating the contribution from this paper to alert systems, especially on stream data. For instance, it would then be possible to 615 build follow-up systems for organized crime or terrorist rings which have particular behaviors such as "gathering-dispersal-reorganization" dynamics. Such chains appear for example when fraudsters assemble for illicit activities and then suddenly disperse to face either an internal or external threat. Inside threats occur in case of betrayal, the subsequent regrouping often being reorganized in 620 order to destroy the betrayal (settling of scores). External threats may be due to police investigations.
Such a system may then be used for early fraud detection in order to prevent frauds before they occur.
For all these works, the volume and complexity of data and treatments may 625 challenge the limits of the current implementation. For this reason, we aim at investigating the use of in-memory graph processing systems.
